Thailand 0-1 Australia: Match Analysis

In an encounter Australia was largely expected to dominate, the Socceroos were insipid and vulnerable to a dangerous Thailand. Winfried Schafer deserves great credit for Thailand's stubborn and animated performances against Australia. Mr Schafer, be honest now - have you been reading Pass and Move? His tactical plan to neutralise Australia's left flank was remarkably similar to PM's feature on 'How to dismantle Australia'. The scoreboard may have read one-nil to the visitors, but it was the Thais who escaped with greater credit. 

Given that Osieck restored the system that had recently been successful, with Holman reverting to the withdrawn striker role, McKay back at left midfield, and Zullo resuming his role as the left fullback, PM readers are justified in asking why Australia was so ineffective. Simply put, those failings that Australia suffered from against Oman and Thailand before, resurfaced despite the switch in personnel. Specifically, Australia were prone to a lack of width on the left flank, a lack of mobility up-front and a failure to retain possession. Ultimately this was probably a match that was tactically significant for the players that weren't present more than for the players that were. 

Australia's System:
Osieck re-deployed the Socceroos in a 4-4-2/4-3-3 hybrid, with Schwarzer between the sticks, Neill and Spiranovic partnered in central defence, with Wilkshire and Zullo at fullback. Jedinak and Valeri were paired in a conservative double pivot. McKay was narrow at left midfield with Emerton advanced at right wing. Holman was the withdrawn striker with Kennedy leading the line.

Thailand's System:
Schafer deployed Thailand in a 4-4-1-1 system. The Thais sought to maintain their defensive shape and only pressed Australia past the half-way line. The most important points however was Datsakorn Thonglao as the playmaker in midfield, and Suree Sukha, a nominal fullback at right wing. 

Vulnerable down the left:
Schafer's offensive strategy was very effective against Australia. Simply put, he instructed Thailand to target the Socceroos left flank, with Thonglao playing through passes behind the Australian defence, into the space vacated by the advanced Zullo, for Sukha to latch onto. And although Thai attacks foundered, largely due to hesitancy and heavy first touches, Thailand was able to penetrate in behind the Socceroo's defensive line time and again. 

To understand how, we must refer back to the theoretical operation of McKay and Zullo on the left flank. When Australia is in possession, McKay drifts central, looking to link up with double pivot, retain possession and dictate play, while Zullo overlaps, providing the width and pace out-wide that McKay is unable to, secure in the knowledge that McKay provides an extra presence in midfield in the event of am opposition counter-attack.

However, with McKay tucked-in narrow and Zullo advanced, there is a window of time when Australia are very vulnerable down the left, during the transition between an offensive and defensive posture. The space behind the left fullback and next to the centre back is left vacant, which is the inevitable downside of using an advanced fullback.

This is the weakness Schafer sought to exploit, by stationing Sukha fairly high up against Zullo. When the ball was turned over and Thailand gained possession, Thonglao launched well weighted through balls into the space vacated by Zullo, which Sukha raced forward to latch onto. Around the twentieth minute mark, the Thonglao/Sukha combination was able to beat Zullo three times in quick succession.

From then on, Zullo became more cautious and noticeably reluctant to advance, mindful of Thailand targeting his area of responsibility. But his absence in the forward areas disrupted Australia's construction of attacks; as noted above, the width, pace and penetration he provides is vital, as he is the only source for these qualities on the left. 

Zullo, forced back and compelled defend, was the worst possible outcome for Australia. Being deprived of his attacking qualities was bad enough, but even with his new-found caution, the Socceroos were still vulnerable to attacks down the left flank because of Zullo's relative naivety in defence. As a winger converted to fullback, his best defensive work is pre-emptive; by pinning back the opposition right winger. But Sukha wasn't cowed; as a fullback himself, Sukha was confident in his ability to defuse attacks higher up the pitch. So basically Australia got the worst of both worlds; Zullo was restricted, but still defensively vulnerable. Australia's left flank was left impotent AND vulnerable, by the same measure. 

Diagram courtesy of Zonal Marking, Valenica v Baines

Schafer's gambit to exploit the space behind Zullo bears similarity to how Sir Alex Ferguson dealt with both Leighton Baines and Ashley Cole; by stationing Antonio Valencia, an aggresive wide player comfortable on the wing or at fullback high on the right, to exploit the vacant space behind. 

Failure to retain possession:
The Australian midfield axis of Jedinak, Valeri and McKay was uncharacteristically porous in retaining possession. Part of this was undoubtedly psychological; finding themselves in a hostile environment and with their fellow team mates playing poorly is hardly conducive to confidence. But Thailand were also efficient in pressing Australia when the ball was carried over the half-way line, preventing effective build-up play. 

But most importantly, Australia were lacking creativity in central midfield. As PM has noted previously, Osieck is able to call upon a degree of tactical variation when it comes to selecting his preferred double pivot. There is Kilkenny the elegant passer, Jedinak the robust destroyer, and Valeri the energetic runner who is able to complement either. 

The combination of Jedinak and Valeri is most effective when Australia require a defensive shield in midfield, ideally to break up opposition attacks. Against Thailand however, Australia did not require two holding midfielders. With Scafer keen to keep nine players behind the ball, and Neill and Spiranovic ably marshalling the lone striker, one of the holders was left redundant.

Moreover, presented with such a massed and organised defence, the lack of creative passing from Jedinak or Valeri became a real impairment. Neither was able to offer penetration through the middle, and Australian attacks were funnelled down the flanks. As noted in PM's analysis of the match against Oman, the Socceroos seem to have lost the ability to play an effective aerial game. So shoving Australia out to the flanks largely obfuscated the attacking threat. 

In such a situation, the Socceroos would have undoubtedly benefited from the presence of Neil Kilkenny, a superb creative passer, in midfield. It seems Kilkenny is now the favoured punching bag for overeager TWG commenters, the very same ones who wrote off Lucas Neill as over-the-hill and dismissed Brett Holman as not being an actual football player. The oft-repeated criticism of the Bristol City player (granted not the best of career decisions) is that he plays 'too many sideways passes'. This is overlooking his very vital function; to retain and then distribute possession. Criticising Kilkenny for too many sideways passes is tantamount to criticising Xavi Hernandez, Xabi Alonso or Michael Carrick for exhibiting the talents that made them world class. Kilkenny is also the only Socceroos player with excellent long-range passing ability. 

Had he been present, Australia would have benefited from faster circulation of the ball, which would have pulled apart Thailand's half-press, and higher distribution, which might have reached Holman more effectively, pulling the playmaker into the game. 

It bears remembering that the best performance by the Socceroos for many years, in which the Green and Gold produced their most fluent, fluid and attacking performance ever, was against Wales, and was facilitated by the short passing, intelligent movement and positional interchange of Matt McKay and Neil Kilkenny. 

Lack of mobility:
If Kilkenny is the favoured punching bag for TWG commenters, then Kennedy should be the favoured punching bag for PM Readers. PM has criticised the messianic target man rather harshly in the past, but against Thailand, the Nagoya man earned every barb. His atrocious movement has been remarked upon in the past, but his performance reached new lows in that he actively prevented his team mates from playing effectively. 

Holman is practically the textbook definition of mobility, such is the verve and fearlessness exhibited by the AZ attacker. But paired with Kennedy, who refused to budge, Holman was deprived of vacant space to exploit. Kennedy staying static prevented Holman from playing. 

This links back to a point made by ZM, that it is simply not enough to just be a goal scorer anymore. With football becoming ever increasingly more systematised, the ability to contribute and facilitate to the operation of the collective has become more valuable than individual quality. Put simply; stuff the goal scorers. The poachers of the past are finished; Fowler and Owen walked into the night a long time ago. It is the goal creators that are important.

Given Kennedy's poor performances, it is imperative that Osieck reconsider the situation of Scott McDonald, undoubtedly the most mobile of our prospective front-men. McDonald's  selfless vacating of space and willingness to run off the ball has the potential to allow Brett Holman's bursting runs to become devastating for Australia, in a manner reminiscent of Tevez's displays for Manchester City, you know, before the whole Munich kerfuffle. 

Goal Analysis:
76' Holman - Best passage of play for the playmaker all night, and it was because he had SPACE to exploit. It was also the first time the theory of Kennedy and Holman up-front actually worked. The Thai back line pushed up ludicrously high. Jedinak intercept, pass to Kennedy on the half-way line. Kennedy shields the ball, holding it up, waiting. Holman makes a run, Kennedy slips the ball to him. Holman dribbles, lays off to Emerton on the right, who measures a chip, which is put away determinedly by Holman.

Take note; Holman is effective at exploiting space and Emerton is really good at delivering the ball. So ask him to do it in Sky Blue, Sydney. Cazarine can really put away the headers. 

Conclusion:
All of these failings are inter-dependent. Had Australia been able to retain possession, Zullo would not have been forced back. Were Zullo able to advance unencumbered, McKay would have been able to dictate play down the left. Had McKay been able to dictate play, we might have seen more mobility from the front-line. Were the front-line more mobile, PM would not have an axe to grind.

What is Holger's culpability in this result? It is important to recognise the larger picture. Australia are through to the next round with games to spare, which is a relief considering McKay is suspended. This might allow Osieck the chance to re-call the Scoreless Wonder from his Middlesbrough exile.

As in everything in life, hindsight is 20/20. On initial viewing, Holger's selected line-up was strong and robust, traits that he has fallen back on in tough situations. Hopefully these two trying matches will have reinforced the claims of Kilkenny, and re-energised McDonald's. 

Duh-doi! Open net! Seriously though, bring back the Mac Attack.