Olyroos
Formation:
Vidmar
deployed the Olyroos in an aggressive and fluid 4-3-3. Ryan was
between the sticks, Jurman and Ryall were paired in central defence,
with Mullen and Foschini conservative at left and right fullback.
Bozanic was deepest in the midfield trio, distributing possession out
of the backline. Nichols was a creative passer, generally drifting to
the right. Brown made runs in support of Hoffman from attacking midfield. Petratos stayed
wide at left wing, Dugandzic was inverted at right wing, while
Hoffman led the line as the No 9.
Uzbekistan
Formation:
Abramov
sent out the Uzbeks in quite an anachronistic 'British' 4-4-2.
Kuvvatov was between the sticks, Ismatullaev and Tuttahojhev were
paired in central defence with Mustafaev and Khodjiak fairly advanced
at left and right fullback. Kilichev and Hasanov were in a classic
creator/destroyer pair in midfield, the former sitting deep allowing
the latter to support the attack creatively. Musaev and Zoteev were
at left and right wing, with Guryanov and Turaev paired in a
traditional strike partnership.
So please don't take my Behich away:
With
the absence of Aziz Behich, an aggressive left winger-turned-fullback, Vidmar sent out a conservative back-four. Mullen and Foschini are nominal
defenders, and so were naturally more conservative in the fullback
roles, advancing but not overlapping.
This is the second match in a row where the absence of Aziz Behich was more of an influence than his actual presence, following van't Schip's tactics in the 3-1 loss to Central Coast.
Bozanic
deepest:
Behich's absence and the consequent flat back-four allowed Vidmar to field Bozanic as the deepest of his midfield trio.
In the previous Olyroos fixture against the UAE, Nichols and Bozanic
were paired in attacking midfield and Behich was very aggressive at left
fullback, so to compensate, Vidmar deployed Diogo Ferraira, a tough
tackling and energetic defender, as the holding midfielder. This
worked quite effectively; Ferreira was barely involved in build-up
play and he was only passed to virtually as a last result, but he was
active in defusing and disrupting opposition attacks, which gave the
trio of Behich, Bozanic and Nichols license to attack.
In
this instance, Vidmar didn't need a tough tackling holder, as his two
fullbacks weren't inclined to attack. He could afford to deploy
Bozanic as an extra passer, increasing the fluidity of his midfield,
without compromising the security of his backline, as Mullen and
Foschini could be relied upon to defend.
This
resulted in a change in Bozanic's role. Against the UAE, Bozanic's role was remarkably similar to his role atCentral Coast; as the left central midfielder, he is tasked with
providing support on the left for Rose and attacking central areas. As the deepest in the
midfield trio against Uzbekistan, his role was very different, and
revolved around patiently distributing possession.
Bozanic was very effective in this role, and although I don't have
access to statistics, I'm guessing his first half pass completion
rate would be somewhere in the 90's.
The
case against Mitch Nichols:
Hold
your horses there Brisbane fans, yes that was a deliberately
provocative subtitle. Mitch Nichols is a fine player, who has
excellent technical quality, passing ability and creative vision; his
call-up to the Socceroos squad was well deserved, if a little
unexpected.
Although
he was wearing the No 10, if, or more likely when, he moves overseas,
he probably won't succeed as an advanced playmaker or trequartista,
the position associated with that number. The mark against him is his
lack of pace. By no means a slow player, he lacks the devastating
acceleration of speedsters like James Brown or Mate Dugandzic.
As
outlined by Michael Cox, pace has become arguably the most important
attribute for young players, because of the increasing tendency for
counter-attacking football. Because teams are much more organised and
compact defensively in contemporary football, playing on the
counter-attack has become the predominant strategy. Because of this
prevalence, pace has become the most valuable quality.
Players such
as Gareth Bale, Aaron Lennon and Theo Walcott embody this principle;
all three are blessed with incredible speed and acceleration, and yet despite lacking in technical quality in their earlier years, were able to progress their careers due to their remarkable physical capabilities. Think back to Gareth Bale's phenomenal San Siro hat-trick, which came courtesy of rapid counter-attacking through a sluggish high
defensive line, and wouldn't have been possible without Bale's
incredible speed.
There is also the consideration that modern day
creative players, because of the tendency for teams to use holding
midfielders to patrol the space between the lines, have been shifted out onto the flanks. This is why the fantasistas of the modern day, like Leo
Messi, Cristiano Ronaldo and Wayne Rooney, started their careers as
wide players cutting-inside as opposed to advanced players, drifting
'in the hole'. Even Vidmar tacitly acknowledged Nichols' lack of the
ability to cover ground; he was nominally deployed as the middle
midfielder, with James Brown, and his searing pace, providing close
support for the lone striker Hoffman as the most advanced attacking
midfielder.
Another relevant comparison can be applied to the man who currently occupies the No 10 for the Socceroos, Harry Kewell. If you go back to his days as a marauding left winger for Leeds, you'll notice just how dependent Kewell used to be on his speed. That stunning left footed 40-yard volley against Arsenal was made possible by his pace, taking him away from his immediate marker and springing the Gunners' high line.
So
what is left for Nichols, who as noted above, possesses exceptional
technical quality, creative vision and passing ability? Look no
further than another member of the Golden Generation, who possessed
the exact same qualities as Nichols, but was similarly hampered by a
lack of speed. I'm talking of course about Jason Culina. He was
similarly deployed as an advanced playmaker in the NSL, but under
Guus Hiddink at PSV, was converted to a No 4, a deep lying regista or
passing midfielder.
A word on the selection:
Although Vidmar's squad was restricted to A-League players, there was plenty of experience present. Of the starting XI, Ryan, Jurman, Bozanic, Nichols and Dugandzic can be considered crucial contributors to their respective club sides, and 'first choice' players. They were naturally the more effective presences in the team. Of the ten A-League clubs, Wellington, Perth and Newcastle did not have representatives in the XI.
There was a decent level of consistency between the Olyroos XI against Uzbekistan, and the fixture previously covered by PM, against the UAE. Jurman and Ryall were still in central defence, Foschini remained as a defensive rightback, Nichols and Bozanic were still in central midfield trios though with slightly different roles, Hoffman still led the line and Brown started both matches, but as a right winger in the former and as an attacking midfielder in the latter.
Revenge
of the Sith...I mean Abramov:
Vadim
Abramov is back. With a vengeance. The man with a moustache who puts
Movember and hipsters to shame, and who helmed Uzbekistan to a
remarkable semi-final appearance at January's Asian Cup, only to
preside over the unmitigated disaster that was a catastrophic six-nil
defeat to a rampant Australia, also doubles up as the Olympic coach.
As Michael Cox noted, that 6-0 match was remarkable for the discrepancy
between the possession stats and goals; in the first half, Uzbekistan
had 67% of possession, yet barely threatened. With a naïve
backline, Australia were able to launch ruthless and simple
counter-attacks to overwhelm the Uzbek defence. One of the
interesting tactical features of that game was Abramov's use of Odil
Akhmedov, the main playmaker, as a centre back. Played out of
position, Akhmedov acted as an old-style libero, charging out of the
defence to initiate the attack.
Formation
clash and role reversal:
With
Australia set out in a fluid 4-3-3, and Uzbekistan deployed in an
old-style 4-4-2, the match settled into a predictable pattern.
Australia would patiently work the ball in midfield, using their
extra man to create passing triangles, as the two Uzbek strikers both
stayed high occupying Jurman and Ryalll. Attacks would eventually
break down in the Uzbekistan defensive third, allowing them to
initiate quick and direct counter-attacks. The Uzbeks looked to work
the ball wide to the wingers, and then use their two strikers to
present a goal threat.
It
must be said that Australia were quite proficient at keeping
possession; as noted above Bozanic was impressive in his
distribution.
Ironically
enough, the roles of Australia and Uzbekistan were reversed from that
6-0 thrashing, with Australia the team trying to keep possession and
Uzbekistan sitting deep and counter-attacking through the wide players.
Ultimately, both teams were unable to establish rhythms in the first half, with the match regularly interrupted by corners and free kicks.
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4 comments:
Australia played apart from in 3 areas: we lacked width as you've said and Behich's absence contributed to that; we lacked movement off the ball in the final third so that out fluent play (until that point) then broke down. The lack of movement meant that all our players were marked and that other players didn't open space for a penetrating pass. The third area of course was that we didn't score. Even some long range shots would have encouraged the Uzbek defence to step out.
All in all, not a bad performance, though I'm uncertain were it leaves us in regards to qualification.
Cheers Bela
Possession football is ineffective without attacking fullbacks. Without Behich, the Olyroos might have got better results by sitting deep and playing on the counter, giving Dugandzic and Brown space to run in front. Although being the visiting team, the Uzbeks might not have been keen to take the initiative anyhow.
Cheers for the comment apholden,
I think the essential point is that possession football is ineffective without width, and attacking fullbacks are one of the most effective methods to achieve this
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